• With cell phones to tell them the time, there is no need for a wristwatch.
• Email is just too slow….
• They never twisted the coiled handset wire aimlessly around their wrists while chatting on the phone.
• Unless they found one in their grandparents’ closet, they have never seen a carousel of Kodachrome slides.
• Computers have never lacked a CD-ROM disk drive.
• The first computer they probably touched was an Apple II; it is now in a museum.
• They first met Michelangelo when he was just a computer virus.

We all know that technology is evolving at breakneck speed. But it’s always interesting to see just what impact these changes are having on our next generation of workers, inventors and policy makers. It’s amazing how developments in technology have fundamentally affected their worldview.

The difficulty of predicting what technology is going to catch on, and the impact such technology will have on society, is obvious. However, another interesting issue is what impact technology will have on the law. The traditional mantra is that technology changes too fast for the law to keep up. Legislatures are hard-pressed to anticipate technological changes and deal with the legal issues that such changes create. However, in some cases legislatures have attempted to anticipate technological developments – often with interesting results.

I have been developing lectures for an online LLM course I will be teaching this fall in Internet and E-Commerce Law. I was reminded of two pieces of legislation that were enacted in the 1990s to deal with “emerging” technologies that can be seen as somewhat anachronistic in light of later developments.

The first is the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992. The Act was Congress’s response to a controversy between the music industry and the consumer electronics industry regarding the introduction of digital audio recording technology into the domestic consumer market. Everyone thought digital tape recording was going to be the “next big thing” and the music industry was concerned about the ability of these recording devices for piracy. Exempted from the Act were computers, which were viewed in 1992 as an unlikely device for music copying. Well, we know how well that prediction panned out. Portable music players, like the iPod, were not covered by the Act, while digital audio tape recorders (what are they, you might ask?) were. Neither the music industry nor Congress foresaw such technologies as the Internet, broadband, or audio compression (MP3) that would make the copying and transmission of music files over the Internet quick and easy. Oops.

Another interesting, but somewhat irrelevant law, is the DMCA provisions on copyright management information. In 1998, pundits saw a day when digital content files would contain “copyright management information” (CMI) that would be “read” by software and hardware devices and would control the uses that could be made of a digital work. For example, futurists foresaw a time when Internet users could download or share content files and the computer would read the CMI from the file and, depending on what the user wanted to do with the file, would automatically transmit a micropayment from the user’s bank account to the copyright owner’s bank account for an appropriate license. Photocopiers would “read” microscopic barcodes printed on each page of a book or magazine, which would determine whether a particular page could be copied at all, and if so, whether a micropayment should be made to the copyright owner for that copy.

Twelve years later, CMI technology is little used and certainly not a hot topic in legal circles or the courts.. The “problem” that proponents of the CMI legislation identified has never materialized. Oops.

That is not to say that legislatures should never legislate in anticipation of new technologies, only that they should be careful in determining which issues are ripe for legislation and which are not.

Perhaps they should ask an entering college student?

Rupert Murdock, head of News Corp., and Dean Singleton, chairman of the Associated Press, have both singled out Google, claiming that Google is “misappropriating” their news. They claim that Google should be forced to pay to link to the news articles that they already post online – for free. Or, in the alternative, or perhaps in addition, they want to charge Internet users for access to that news.

What they don’t seem to realize is that news is NOT the issue. Instead, the problem with newspapers is that the Internet is a much better place for most advertisers than print publications. It is the loss of advertisers that is killing newspapers, not Google.

It is Craigslist, and eBay, and a thousand other online services that have siphoned off newspapers’ classified ad revenues. Once viewed as one of the most lucrative revenue generators, classified ad sections today are a shadow of their former selves. Those advertising dollars have moved online.

The same is true for display ads. For Macy’s to advertise a nationwide sale, it must either pay local newspapers in every geographic region in which it has stores to run multi-page ads (at enormous expense), or it can spend a fraction of that money to place those same ads on its own website, as well as mounting an effective email marketing campaign directly to its customers. It’s no wonder that the big, fat Sunday newspapers of yesteryear are now about the size of a Tuesday edition.

Newsstand and subscription revenues don’t ever cover the costs of distributing newspapers, let alone the costs of an editorial staff. No matter what Google does, if newspapers can’t attract and maintain advertisers, they are doomed.

The first ten years of my practice saw a need to learn copyright law, while the second ten years required a working knowledge of patent and trademark law, and some privacy law, with a little international trade law thrown in for good measure (including U.S. export control laws and regulations). It was also the time when state and federal legislators were beginning to craft a specialized field of computer crime laws.

By the late 1980s there was a convergence of sorts between the computer and entertainment industries, primarily through videogames and CD-ROM titles. As a result, computer lawyers needed to learn about how the entertainment industry worked – again, primarily in the contracting area — but also with regard to trademarks, Hollywood guilds and unions (e.g., SAG, DGA) and right of publicity issues. It also required computer lawyers to learn a lot more about copyright and contract law in areas that had previously been limited to entertainment lawyers.

Since the 1990s we have seen the subject matter of computer law expand rapidly. We have had to learn telecommunications law, expand our knowledge of trademark law to deal with domain name issues, cope with the ever-expanding body of federal and state laws that deal with the financial laws and regulations underpinning e-commerce, privacy issues, cybercrimes, and a host of other fields that computer lawyers (now called IT lawyers) never thought they would need to deal with.

Now, cloud computing may require us to learn another body of law – admiralty law. Google has recently filed patent applications for ocean-going data centers that would be housed on large merchant ships and could be moored off-shore or sail blissfully in international waters – avoiding the problems arising from pesky local or national laws. These ships would generate their own power, provide their own cooling, have Internet connectivity (presumably from satellites or undersea cables) and generally be subject to no country’s laws. But underlying this concept is still the fact that we are dealing with ships. And ships are subject to both national and international laws – namely admiralty laws.

Dang. Just when I thought I was done learning new laws, I now find myself having to delve into the esoteric area of admiralty law. Ships containing data centers are no different than, and are subject to the same laws as, any other ship. Thus, they are subject to such things as piracy, salvage and seizure (arrest). Yet their cargoes may be infinitely more valuable than any previous ship that has ever plied international waters – the data of thousands or tens of thousands of corporations, millions of individuals, and numerous governments from around the world. How much would that cargo be worth if it fell into the hands of Somali pirates? And what if the assets of even one customer (or the ship owner itself) were subject to a seizure (arrest) order, and the entire ship was seized and the computers taken off the grid?

Far fetched? It was only a couple of months ago that the FBI, looking for assets of a company that had allegedly defraud the local telephone company, raided and seized all of the servers in several Dallas-based data centers – putting all of the data centers’ customers, not just the target of the seizure, out of business. Now multiply that by thousands of customers whose access to their data could be lost if the ship on which their servers and data are housed is arrested under existing admiralty law.

So to all of you IT lawyers representing clients that have or will be entering into cloud computing “solutions” to their data processing needs – start boning up on your admiralty law. It looks like you’re going to need it.

AP Chairman Dean Singleton, who spoke at the AP annual meeting in San Diego several months ago, was quoted as saying: “The news cooperative would work with portals and other partners who properly license content – and would pursue legal and legislative actions against those who don’t. We can no longer stand by and watch others walk off with our work under misguided legal theories.”

The main “misguided legal theory” that Singleton was referring to is the copyright concept of “fair use” — which allows others to quote from, refer to, and otherwise use portions (and in some cases the entire content of) another’s copyrighted work. While AP’s wrath is undoubtedly proper when focused on blogs and other websites that take AP’s news stories in their entirety, Singleton directs most of his anger at Google and other search engines, whom he claims are stealing AP’s copyright content by using its headlines and sometimes short snippets of an article in its search results. He is wrong on many fronts.

First, the technology developed by Google didn’t come free. Tens of millions of dollars have been invested by Google in technologies with no guaranty that they would work, or that anyone would care to use them. Content providers assume, somehow, that the complex platforms that make search engines, etc. work are free, or without risk. Google was willing to take that chance and has, so far, seen a good return on its investment. The newspapers have not been willing to take that risk.

Second, nothing is preventing newspapers (or other content providers) from building competitive platforms to compete with Google. They have chosen not to do so, but instead complain about Google’s willingness to do so. If Google is, as alleged, siphoning off money that should be going to the newspapers, then let the newspapers develop their own, competitive platforms and capture that “lost” revenue themselves. Every website can choose whether to allow search engines to index these site or not. It’s as easy as setting a “switch” in the robot.txt file. If AP, or any of its affiliates believe that Google or other search engines are unfairly exploiting their content by indexing it on their databases, it’s a simple thing to opt out of future indexing.

But to do so would be suicide for these websites, since search engines make their content accessible. Without them no website would be successful (and most would be invisible to users). Yet, Google doesn’t charge anyone for being indexed and made accessible. There is again an enormous cost for Google to continuously update its search engine database to make the most recent articles posted by the newspapers accessible.

Google provides the front end for newspaper websites so that users can find them for free. Snippets are how users find newspaper sites, and are not a substitute for those sites. Without the ability to use snippets in indexing news stories, users would find it difficult to locate the content they want on news sites. The fact that newspapers have not successfully exploited the free accessibility provided by Google is the newspapers’ fault, not Google’s.

Search engines are not AP’s enemy. Without them AP content would be inaccessible, and AP-affiliate websites would be invisible. While these are those who improperly repurpose AP’s content, and AP is well within its rights to stop such activities, AP’s focus on search engines is wrong-headed, and self-defeating.

Even after hearing their side of the story, I am still convinced, that the book industry got a raw deal.

Factual Background

The facts of the case are straightforward. In 2002, Google began quietly digitizing books. Their goal apparently was to digitize every book ever published, whether or not it was still under copyright. The “Google Book Search” project was officially launched in 2004 with agreements with numerous large, research libraries that had agreed to give access to their collections to Google. The Google Book Search service permitted Internet users to search the complete text of the books that had been scanned. However, depending on whether or not the book was still under copyright, the user could either display the entire text (public domain books) or short snippets of text before and after the keywords searched for (in-copyright books).

In September 2005, Google was sued for copyright infringement by the Authors Guild, the American Association of Publishers and a number of individual authors in a class action. The plaintiffs claimed that the project was “massive copyright infringement” and should be shut down. The litigation dragged on for over 3 years, during which time Google scanned, digitized and indexed over seven million books from major university libraries.

Summary of Settlement

On October 28, 2008, the parties announced a settlement of the litigation. The agreement, stretching to 141 pages, provides that Google will pay $125 million plus establish a new licensing system with publishers. The system will allow any copyright owner to opt-out of the settlement, will require Google to pay 63% of all revenues generated by the use of copyrighted books to a “collection society” (the “Book Rights Registry”) for distribution to copyright owners, and require the implementation of a DRM/subscription model for full-text access, but not for searching –- which will be limited to short snippets for in-copyright works.

Who Won?

While the copyright owners will receive compensation for the use of their in-copyright, but out-of-print books, and will require Google to negotiate separate deals with copyright owners of in-print, in-copyright books, the settlement, in my opinion (as well as an increasing number of critics) definitely favors Google for a number of reasons.

1. First mover advantage. Google has been feverishly digitizing books for over 4 years now. It has processed at least seven million books. While perhaps not a “critical mass” of books yet, it is an enormous head start over any potential competitor.

2. All publishers bound by the settlement. Because the case was filed as class action, all publishers will be bound by the terms of the settlement unless they choose to opt out. This includes not just U.S.-based publishers, but publishers in every Berne Convention country – basically every country with a publishing industry. For publishers that do not opt out, they will be bound by the terms of the settlement. Google does not have to negotiate separately with every publisher (except those that might opt out). Any future competitor, however, will need to negotiate with every publisher – a very expensive proposition – and there is no guarantee that a competitor would be able to cut an identical deal with every publisher, or even a deal that is as good as what Google is getting. Indeed, if the settlement plays out as I envision, publishers will be so angry that any competitor that attempts to duplicate Google’s service will be in for a rough time cutting a reasonable deal.

3. Barriers to entry. Google already has deals with a number of the major research libraries to have access to their collections for free, in exchange for which they will get a copy of the digital database (and some other benefits). Any competitor probably will not be able to make the same deal with these major libraries. It is unlikely that the same libraries would want to put up with the disruption to their organization of having multiple scanning projects going on at the same time. Competitors would need to find other collections to digitize, or pay a large amount of money to these libraries – a cost that Google did not have to incur.

4. High settlement amount. The large amount will discourage others from entering the field – giving Google a virtual monopoly on every book coming within the settlement. Publishers will not be willing to give subsequent competitors a better deal.

5. Others cannot claim fair use. It will be more difficult for others to claim “fair use” if they decided to compete with Google. While there was no determination of whether Google’s conduct was or is a “fair use,” a judge in a subsequent case may look at this settlement as “evidence” that massive digitizing of copyrighted works is not a fair use – otherwise, why would Google, which claimed fair use all along, have settled for such a large amount? A decision in this case that Google’s use of copyrighted material was a fair use would have opened the door for many competitors to piggyback on the court’s decision and built competitive databases protected by fair use. So a lack of a ruling on this pivotal issue definitely plays into Google’s hands.

6. The settlement grants a compulsory license to Google for all books printed prior to February 5, 2009. The settlement establishes a legal business model for Google to monetize this huge and growing database of copyrighted materials with the copyright owners’ blessing. Google get 37% of all revenues generated, where previously it was getting nothing. (This is a much larger percentage than iTunes gets for their music downloading service.)

The settlement agreement is, in essence, a compulsory license for Google to copy virtually any copyrighted work without having to negotiate individually with copyright owners. And it sets the “market rate” for any negotiations Google will have in the future with copyright owners who are not part of the settlement.

7. Google gets to set the rates for the various revenue streams. Perhaps one of the most amazing aspects of the settlement is that Google gets to decide how it will monetize the sale of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works going forward. I cannot think of any previous copyright infringement suit where the alleged infringer not only got an expansive license to continue its allegedly infringing activities, but the infringer is given greater rights to the works than when it was allegedly infringing, and given complete discretion over how it will monetize the exploitation of the plaintiff’s works in the future. (It would be as of the record companies had settled their copyright infringement suit against Napster by giving Napster complete access to their entire catalogs, and letting Napster set the price for selling those songs to its file-sharers, including the right to continue to allow file-sharers to download the songs for free!)

Under the settlement, Google has the right to make money from (i) selling downloads of in-copyright but out-of-print books, (ii) selling advertising on pages in which the copyrighted works are accessible by users, and (iii) selling subscriptions to libraries for access to the book database. But it is Google, and not the copyright holders, who gets to set the price for these revenue streams. Theoretically, Google could charge nothing for these uses of plaintiffs’ books, and the book publishers would get nothing more than the settlement amount. While that is not likely to happen (since publishers still have opt-out rights that could be exercised if they are dissatisfied with the way the scheme is working), there is nothing in the settlement agreement that requires Google to charge a minimum amount, or anything at all.

8. Few copyright owners are likely to opt out. While copyright owners are free to opt-out of the system, it would be foolish for most copyright owners to do so. They essentially have three choices – go along with the system, opt-out and forego the revenues they would get under the system, or try to set up their own system to monetized digitized version of their works (which hasn’t worked in the music industry, and is unlikely to work here). A fourth choice — to do a deal with another database developer — is unlikely for the reasons stated above.

9. The Book Rights Registry will operate at the publishers’ expensive, not Google’s. While Google has earmarked $37 million to establish the “Book Rights Registry,” the actually operating expenses will be borne by the publishers out of their cut. This will save Google untold millions in administration costs, and having to track down the copyright owners of orphan works, works owned by publishers who have either gone out of business or merged into another publisher, and individual copyright owners who may have died and the current ownership of the copyright is splintered amongst his or her heirs.

Conclusion

The cost to Google to settle ($125 million) sounds like a lot on the surface, but will average out to far less than $1 per work that Google will be digitizing over the next several decades. Certainly a cheap price to pay for a compulsory license to a treasure trove of the world’s greatest (and not so great) books.

The revenues generated by this scheme have not gone unnoticed by other copyright owners whose works do not have the ubiquity online of popular music. In the last few weeks, various news stories have surfaced that claim that some owners of copyrighted works have decided to tap into this revenue windfall by surreptitiously posting their own copyrighted works online, waiting until users download them, and then threatening a lawsuit unless the downloaders pay them off. One article claims that certain copyright owners are “priming the pump” by posting their own works online, and then threatening litigation in order to wrest fat settlements from those who download their works. A second article claims that an American pornographer hired a German company to post his videos online, and then hired a law firm to threaten downloaders with copyright infringement litigation unless they “settled” and paid a significant sum.

Some commentators have argued that if a copyright owner uploads its copyrighted content to a free downloading site, the owner should be deemed to have impliedly licensed the downloading of that content, and such license should preclude a later claim of copyright infringement. I agree with that view. The problem that I see with asserting that defense is that 1) the downloader has already been sued and will have to incur the legal fees necessary to establish the defense, and 2) it will be very difficult to prove that the copyright owner authorized the posting of the works on the downloading service.

The proof issue is the major problem with defending against these bogus claims. Copyright owners who choose to implement this scheme generally are not going to post the works from their own computer, nor use employees or third parties who can easily be tracked down and who have no incentive to lie under oath. Instead, they will take steps to hide their tracks, using anonymous posting services, public terminals or hackers to post the materials. That will make it virtually impossible to track the postings back to the copyright owner. In addition, most accused downloaders will not have the money or the expertise to track down the party who actually uploaded the works in the first place and establish the copyright owner’s complicity in the scam.

This scam seems almost unstoppable. You can be sure that more scammers will be using it in the future. As long as copyright law allows owners to extort huge sums out of individuals who download copyrighted materials for personal use, this scheme will proliferate.

The settlement has Google paying the book publishers $125 million in exchange for essentially a perpetual license to digitize and store all of their books now in existence, as well as future books that they may publish. It places strict limitations on Google’s ability to display books that are in-print and in-copyright, but allows Google to not only display portions of out-of-print, but still in-copyright books, but to sell access to those books. Google can charge for access to the digital version of those books, and will be allowed to retain 37% of all revenues generated from the sale of those books and certain advertising revenues it may generate as well. In exchange, the publishers will dismiss their infringement action, and since it was filed as a class action, the settlement will bind both the named plaintiffs but all other U.S. publishers as well, unless they opt out.

This settlement has not gone unnoticed by Viacom, Inc., which also has a major copyright infringement suit pending against Google. Unlike the publishers’ case, the Viacom action involves the posting of Viacom owned videos on YouTube, a company owned by Google. Executives of Viacom are quoted as saying, basically, that since Google settled the publishers’ case, there is no reason it shouldn’t settle with Viacom (and pay Viacom a hefty settlement fee as well). While Google might decide to do so, if it made business sense to do so (as it did in the publishers’ case), the two cases have very little in common, other than the fact that they both involve Google as a defendant and they are both copyright infringement cases.

The Viacom case did not arise from a direct infringement by Google (or YouTube) of any copyrights owned by Viacom – which was the claim in the publishers’ case. Instead, the Viacom action seeks to hold Google liable for third party postings of Viacom videos on the YouTube website. Instead, of having to fit its actions under the fair use doctrine of copyright law, whose reach is very fact-specific, in the Viacom case, Google is able to take advantage of the DMCA “safe harbor” provisions, which immunize Google from any liability, as long as it complies with the requirements of the DMCA. While Viacom is arguing that Google cannot take advantage of the “safe harbor” provisions, that is an uphill battle that Viacom is likely to lose.

These are two very different lawsuits based on two very different provisions of U.S. copyright law. While Google may decide to settle with Viacom for business reasons, or Viacom may be able to convince a judge that Google is not entitled to the protections afforded by the DMCA, the two cases are entirely unrelated. Viacom is taking a big chance by pursuing this case, since of it loses, it will open the floodgates to having its videos posted all over the Internet (even more so that today). It is Viacom that should be looking for a way out of this mess it has gotten itself into, not Google. And you can be sure that any settlement entered into will be much more favorable to Google than to Viacom. (IMHO).

On October 28, 2008, Google and the AAP announced a settlement of the litigation. The agreement, stretching to 141 pages, provides that Google pay $125 million, plus establish a new licensing system with publishers. The system will allow any copyright owner to opt-out of the project, will require Google to pay 63% of all revenues generated by users’ access to the database to a “collection society” (the “Book Rights Registry”) for distribution to copyright owners, and will result in the implementation of a DRM/subscription model for full-text access, but not for search – which will be limited to short snippets for in-copyright works.

Who won?

While the copyright owners will receive compensation for the use of their works, the settlement (if approved by the court) will definitely work in Google’s favor going forward. First, the high settlement amount will discourage others from entering the field – giving Google a virtual monopoly on every book, periodical and other copyrighted work coming within the settlement. Second, it will be more difficult for others to claim “fair use” if they decided to compete with Google. While there was no determination of whether Google’s conduct was or is “fair use,” a judge in a subsequent case may look at this settlement as “evidence” that massive digitizing of copyrighted works is not a fair use – otherwise, why would Google, which claimed fair use all along, have settled for such a large amount? A decision in this case that Google’s use of copyrighted material was a fair use would have opened the door for many competitors who could have piggybacked on the court’s decision and built competitive databases protected by fair use. So a lack of a ruling on this pivotal issue plays into Google’s hands.

The settlement allows Google to charge for access to these millions of digitized works – something that previously would have been difficult for Google to do and still claim “fair use.” So the settlement establishes a legal business model for Google to monetize this huge and growing database of copyrighted materials with the copyright owners’ blessing. Google get 37% of all revenues generated, where previously it was getting nothing. (Much more than iTunes gets for their music downloads.)

The settlement agreement is, in essence, a compulsory license for Google to copy virtually any copyrighted work without having to negotiate individually with copyright owners. And it sets the “market rate” for any negotiations Google will have in the future with copyright owners who are not part of the settlement. While copyright owners are free to opt-out of the system, it would be foolish for most copyright owners to do so. They essentially have three choices – go along with the system, opt-out and forego the revenues they would get under the system, or try to set up their own system to monetized digitized version of their works (which hasn’t worked in the music industry and is unlikely to work here). A fourth choice — do a deal with another database developer — is unlikely, since this settlement sets up huge barriers to entry for any competitive service.

So, despite the price tag, I would say that Google is the big winner in this battle, and that the publishing industry may (no, I predict, WILL) live to regret the day they gave Google exclusive control over the online, worldwide distribution of their works.

Over the last 20 years we have seen a steady erosion of the balance that the copyright law was intended to establish between the rights of the copyright owner and those of the public. We have seen a series of laws, the PRO-IP Act being just the latest, where Congress has given copyright owners increasingly greater rights, with little consideration to their effect on innovation and on user rights.

As stated by Gigi B. Sohn, president and co-founder of Public Knowledge, a Washington, D.C.-based digital rights group, after the Senate’s passage of the bill: “The bill only adds more imbalance to a copyright law that favors large media companies. At a time when the entire digital world is going to less restrictive distribution models, and when the courts are aghast at the outlandish damages being inflicted on consumers in copyright cases, this bill goes entirely in the wrong direction.”

What is needed today is not an IP “czar” but an IP “ombudsman,” tasked with ensuring that legislation provides the proper balance between the rights of owners and those of innovators and users. We need someone who can speak for the public – a role that the Copyright Office abdicated years ago when it became a mouthpiece of copyright owners, and no longer the arbiter of a balanced copyright law. Yet, if we get a president that truly believes in a balanced approach, there is noting in the PRO-IP Act that would prevent him from appointing someone as IP “czar” that would provide a balanced approach to the development of copyright (as well as patent and trademark law). It’s a long shot, but one can only hope. . . .

To allow such an absurd claim to prevail would be to overrule hundreds of years of jurisprudence. For, you see, copyright infringement is a tort. And whether we deem copyright infringement to be an intentional tort, or based on strict liability, in either case the plaintiff must show some conduct that invaded the exclusive rights of the plaintiff as set forth in 17 U.S.C. §106.

It is also axiomatic that no liability attaches unless the defendant actually “copied” the plaintiff’s work, that is, unless the defendant’s work resulted from some electronic or mechanical process linked ultimately to a copy of the plaintiff’s work, or the defendant had “access” to a copy of the plaintiff’s work and produced something that is “substantially similar” to that work.

(link)

The MPAA and RIAA argue that they should be absolved from having to plead or prove such actions, since Internet technology does not permit such proof. Once a user places a file containing a copyrighted movie or sound recording on their hard disk, there is no evidence of whether anyone ever downloaded (copied) that file. Therefore, the argument goes, since we cannot prove that an infringing act ever occurred, we should not be required to do so. We should be allowed to demand $150,000 in statutory damages per song without proving a necessary element of our case – namely, a violation of at least one of the exclusive rights of Section 106.

I am sure every tort plaintiff would love to be able to avoid having to show all of the elements of a prima facie case and still recover enormous damages. I am sure someone who fell down at Wal-Mart would like to recover damages without having to show that the retailer did something wrong. But that’s not how the law works. The plaintiff has to make a prima facie showing of all of the elements of its claim before going to court. If it cannot, it should not file suit.

In the filings by the MPAA and RIAA, they have essentially conceded that they have no evidence that people with movie and music files on their computers are violating the law. As such, they should not be filing lawsuits or threatening college students with meritless claims in an effort to extort money from them. And the lawyers who file these meritless suits should be prepared to pay Rule 11 sanctions. This situation has got to end. Hopefully the judge in the Minnesota case will send a strong message to these organizations that their conduct will no longer be tolerated.